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President Outlines 'Concrete Proposals' For Peace in Republic of Vietnam

"In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic formula. Peace could be achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. Peace could be achieved by an informal understanding, provided that the understanding is clear, and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed. Peace on paper is not as important as peace in fact."

RICHARD M. NIXON
Commander-in-Chief

President Nixon unveiled his Vietnam "peace program" proposals to the American people May 14, telling a nationwide television audience that "The time has come for some new initiatives."

The President explained this country's positions in search for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, including eight measures to be taken following negotiations.

In addition, he outlined terms for negotiation in Paris as: Mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, and free choice for the people of South Vietnam.

Following are the President's remarks:

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

I have asked for this television time tonight to report to you on our most difficult and urgent problem — the war in Vietnam.

Since I took office four months ago, nothing has taken so much of my time and energy as the search for a way to bring lasting peace to Vietnam. I know that some believe I should have ended the war immediately after the inauguration by simply ordering our forces home from Vietnam.

This would have been the easy thing to do. It might have been a popular move. But I would have betrayed my solemn responsibility as President of the United States if I had done so.

I want to end this war. The American people want to end this war. The people of South Vietnam want to end this war. But we want to end it permanently so that the younger brothers of our soldiers in Vietnam will not have to fight in the future in another Vietnam someplace else in the world.

The fact that there is no easy way to end the war does not mean that we have no choice but to let the war drag on with no end in sight.

For four years American boys have been fighting and dying in Vietnam. For 12 months our negotiators have been talking with the other side in Paris. And yet the fighting goes on. The destruction continues. Brave men still die.

The time has come for some new initiatives. Repeating the old formulas and the tired rhetoric of the past is not enough. When Americans are risking their lives in war, it is the responsibility of their leaders to take some risks for peace.

I would like to report to you tonight on some of the things we have been doing in the past four months to bring true peace, and then I would like to make some

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President Outlines 'Concrete Proposals' For Peace in RVN

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concrete proposals to speed that day.

Our first step began before inauguration. This was to launch an intensive review of every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam policy. We accepted nothing on faith, we challenged every assumption and every statistic. We made a systematic, serious examination of all the alternatives open to us. We carefully considered recommendations offered both by critics and supporters of past policies.

From the review, it became clear at once that the new Administration faced a set of immediate operational problems.

—The other side was preparing for a new offensive.

—There was a wide gulf of distrust between Washington and Saigon.

—In eight months of talks in Paris, there had been no negotiations directly concerned with a final settlement.

Therefore, we moved on several fronts at once.

We frustrated the attack which was launched in late February. As a result, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong failed to achieve their military objectives.

We restored a close working relationship with Saigon. In the resulting atmosphere of mutual confidence, President Thieu and his Government have taken important initiatives in the search for a settlement.

We speeded up the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces. I am glad to report tonight, that as a result, General Abrams told me on Monday that progress in the training program had been excellent, and that apart from any developments that may occur in the negotiations in Paris, that time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans.

In weighing alternate courses, we have had to recognize that the situation as it exists today is far different from what it was two years ago or four years ago or ten years ago.

One difference is that we no longer have the choice of not intervening. We have crossed that bridge. There are now more than a half million American troops in Vietnam and 35,000 Americans have lost their lives.

We can have honest debate about whether we should have entered the war in Vietnam. We can have honest debate about how the war has been conducted. But the urgent question today is what to do now that we are there.

Against that background, let me discuss first what we have rejected, and second, what we are prepared to accept.

We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield.

We have also ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised American defeat.

When we assumed the burden of helping defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our long-term hopes for peace in the world. A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great nation must be worthy of trust.

When it comes to maintaining peace, "prestige" is not an empty word. I am not speaking of false pride or bravado — they should have no place in our policies. I speak, rather, of the respect that one nation has for another's integrity in defending its principles and meeting its obligations.

If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

Another reason for not withdrawing unilaterally stems from debates within the Communist world between those who argue for a policy of containment or confrontation with the United States, and those who argue against it.

If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force — even after the power of the United States had been engaged — it would greatly strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiation, who advocate aggression, who minimize the risks of confrontation with the United States. It would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later.

If we are to move successfully from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, then we have to demonstrate — at the point at which confrontation is being tested — that confrontation with the United States is costly and unrewarding.

Almost without exception, the leaders of non-Communist Asia have told me that they would consider a one-sided American withdrawal from Vietnam to be a threat to the security of their own nations.

In determining what choices would be acceptable, we have to understand our essential objective in Vietnam: What we want is very little, but very fundamental. We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.

Let me put it plainly: What the United States wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What is important is what the people of South Vietnam want for South Vietnam.

The United States has suffered over a million casualties in four wars in this century. Whatever faults we may have as a nation, we have asked nothing for ourselves in return for those sacrifices. We have been generous toward those whom we have fought. We have helped our former foes as well as our friends in the task of reconstruction. We are proud of this record, and we bring the same

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attitude in our search for a settlement in Vietnam.

In this spirit, let me be explicit about several points:

—We seek no bases in Vietnam.

—We seek no military ties.

—We are willing to agree to neutrality for South Vietnam if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.

—We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

—We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

—We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion.

—We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of North Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

At this point, I would like to add a personal word based on many visits to South Vietnam over the past five years. This is the most difficult war in America's history, fought against a ruthless enemy. I am proud of our men who have carried the terrible burden of this war with dignity and courage, despite the division and opposition to the war in the United States. History will record that never have America's fighting men fought more bravely for more unselfish goals than our men in Vietnam. It is our responsibility to see that they have not fought in vain.

In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic formula. Peace could be achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. Peace could be achieved by an informal understanding, provided that the understanding is clear, and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed. Peace on paper is not as important as peace in fact.

This brings us to the matter of negotiations.

We must recognize that peace in Vietnam cannot be achieved overnight. A war that has raged for many years will require detailed negotiations and cannot be settled by a single stroke.

What kind of a settlement will permit the South Vietnamese people to determine freely their own political future? Such a settlement will require the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces, including our own, from South Vietnam, and procedures for political choice that give each significant group in South Vietnam a real opportunity to participate in the political life of the nation.

To implement these principles, I reaffirm now our willingness to withdraw our forces on a specified timetable. We ask only that North Vietnam withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into North Vietnam, also in accordance with a timetable.

We include Cambodia and Laos to insure that these countries would not be used as bases for a renewed war. Our offer provides for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by both sides; for agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable; and for the withdrawal to be accomplished quickly.

The North Vietnamese delegates have been saying in Paris that political issues should be discussed along with military issues, and there must be a political settlement in the South. We do not dispute this, but the military withdrawal involves outside forces, and can, therefore, be properly negotiated by North Vietnam and the United States, with the concurrence of its allies.

The political settlement is an internal matter which ought to be decided among the South Vietnamese themselves, and not imposed by outsiders. However, if our presence at these political negotiations would be helpful, and if the South Vietnamese concerned agreed, we would be willing to participate, along with the representatives of Hanoi, if that also were desired.

Recent statements by President Thieu have gone far toward opening the way to a political settlement. He has publicly declared his government's willingness to discuss a political solution with the National Liberation Front, and has offered free elections. This was a dramatic step forward, a reasonable offer that could lead to a settlement. The South Vietnamese Government has offered to talk without preconditions. I believe the other side should also be willing to talk without preconditions.

The South Vietnamese government recognizes, as we do, that a settlement must permit all persons and groups that are prepared to renounce the use of force to participate freely in the political life of South Vietnam. To be effective, such a settlement would require two things: First, a process that would allow the South Vietnamese people to express their choice; and, second, a guarantee that this process would be a fair one.

We do not insist on a particular form of guarantee. The important thing is that the guarantees should have the confidence of the South Vietnamese people, and that they should be broad enough and strong enough to protect the interests of all major South Vietnamese groups.

This, then, is the outline of the settlement that we seek to negotiate in Paris. Its basic terms are very simple: Mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, and free choice for the people of South Vietnam. I believe that the long-term interests of peace require that we insist on no less, and that the realities of the situation require that we seek no more.

And now, to make very concrete what I have said, I propose the following specific measures, which seem to be consistent with the principles of all parties. These proposals are made on the basis of full consultation with President Thieu.

—As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

—Over a period of twelve months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U.S., Allied, and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this twelve month period, the remaining U.S., Allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

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President Proposes a Third Dimension for NATO

THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY

"The industrial nations share no challenge more urgent than that of bringing 20th century man and his environment to terms with one another," President Nixon said recently.

To meet this challenge, he urged that our Western Alliance be given "a third dimension"—a social dimension—in addition to its vital military and political functions. Below are excerpts from the President's address at the 20th Anniversary meeting of the NATO ministerial council in Washington, D. C. on April 10.

Two decades ago, the men who founded NATO faced the truth of their times; as a result, the Western world prospers today in freedom. We must follow their example by once again facing the truth—not of earlier times, but of our own times.

The allies have learned to harmonize their military forces; now, in the light of the vast military, economic, and political changes of two decades, we must devise better means of harmonizing our policies.

A New Committee for a New Goal

I strongly urge that we create a committee on the challenges of modern society, responsible to the Deputy Ministers, to explore ways in which the experience and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshaled toward improving the quality of life of our peoples.

That new goal is provided for in Article II of our treaty, but it has never been the center of our concerns. Let me put my proposal in concrete terms and in personal terms.

On my recent trip to Europe I met with world leaders and private citizens alike. I was struck by the fact that our discussions were not limited to military or political matters. More often than not our talks turned to those matters deeply relevant to our societies—the legitimate unrest of young people, the frustration of the gap between generations, the need for a new sense of idealism and purpose in coping with an automating world.

These were not subjects apart from the concerns of NATO; indeed they went to the very heart of the real world we live in. We are not allies because we are bound by treaty; we bind ourselves by treaty because we are allied in meeting common purposes and common concerns.

Alliance Needs a Third Dimension

For 20 years, our nations have provided for the military defense of Western Europe. For 20 years we have held political consultations.

Now the alliance of the West needs a third dimension.

It needs not only a strong military dimension to provide for the common defense, and not only a more profound political dimension to shape a strategy of peace, but it also needs a social dimension to deal with our concern for the quality of life in this last third of the 20th Century.

This concern is manifested in many ways—culturally, technologically, through the humanities and the sciences.

The Western nations share common ideals and a common heritage. We are all advanced societies, sharing the benefits and the gathering torments of a rapidly advancing industrial technology. The industrial nations share no challenge more urgent than that of bringing 20th Century man and his environment to terms with one another—of making the world fit for man, and helping man to learn how to remain in harmony with the rapidly changing world.

We in the United States have much to learn from the experiences of our Atlantic allies in their handling of internal matters: For example, the care of infant children in West Germany, the "new towns" policy of Great Britain, the development of depressed areas programs

"The great skill of the Dutch in dealing with high density areas . . ."

in Italy, the great skill of the Dutch in dealing with high density areas, the effectiveness of urban planning by local governments in Norway, the experience of the French in metropolitan planning.

Having forged a working partnership, we all have a unique opportunity to pool our skills, our intellects, and our inventiveness in finding new ways to use technology to enhance our environments, and not to destroy them.

The work of this committee would not be competitive with any now being carried on by other international agencies. Neither would it be our purpose to limit this cooperation and the benefits that flow from it to our own countries. Quite the opposite; our purpose would be to share both ideas and benefits, recognizing that these problems have no national or regional boundaries. This could become the most positive dimension of the Alliance, opening creative new channels to all the rest of the world.

When I visited the North Atlantic Council in Brussels I posed the question: "In today's world, what kind of an alliance shall we strive to build?"

Today I have sketched out some of the approaches that I believe the Alliance should take.

I believe we must build an Alliance strong enough to deter those who might threaten war, close enough to provide for continuous and far-reaching consultation, trusting enough to accept the diversity of views, realistic enough to deal with the world as it is, and flexible enough to explore new channels of constructive cooperation.

"We all have a unique opportunity to pool our skills, our intellects and our inventiveness in finding new ways to use technology to enhance our environments."

"The experience of the French in metropolitan planning . . ."

President's Peace Proposals

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—The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would complete their withdrawals as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

—An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

—This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised cease fires in Vietnam.

—As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

—Arrangements would be made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time.

—All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

I believe this proposal for peace is realistic, and takes account of the legitimate interests of all concerned. It is consistent with President Thieu's six points. It can accommodate the various programs put forth by the other side. We and the Government of South Vietnam are prepared to discuss its details with the other side.

Secretary Rogers is now in Saigon and he will be discussing with President Thieu how, together, we may put forward these proposed measures most usefully in Paris. He will, as well, be consulting with our other Asian allies on these measures while on his Asian trip. However, I would stress that these proposals are not offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We are quite willing to consider other approaches consistent with our principles.

We are willing to talk about anybody's program—Hanoi's four points, the NLF's 10 points—provided it can be made consistent with the very few basic principles I have set forth here.

Despite our disagreement with several of its points, we welcome the fact that the NLF has put forward its first comprehensive program. We are studying that program carefully. However, we cannot ignore the fact that immediately after the offer, the scale of enemy attacks stepped up and American casualties in Vietnam increased.

Let me make one point clear. If the enemy wants peace with the United States, that is not the way to get it.

I have set forth a peace program tonight which is generous in its terms. I have indicated our willingness to consider other proposals. But no greater mistake could be made than to confuse flexibility with weakness or of being reasonable with lack of resolution. I must also make clear, in all candor, that if the needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.

Reports from Hanoi indicate that the enemy has given up hope for a military victory in South Vietnam, but is counting on a collapse of American will in the United States. There could be no greater error in judgment.

Let me be quite blunt. Our fighting men are not going to be worn down; our mediators are not going to be talked down; and our allies are not going to be let down.

My fellow Americans, I have seen the ugly face of war in Vietnam. I have seen the wounded in field hospitals—American boys, South Vietnamese boys, North Vietnamese boys. They were different in many ways—the color of their skins, their religions, their races, some were enemies; some were friends.

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But the differences were small, compared with how they were alike. They were brave men, and they were so young. Their lives—their dreams for the future—had been shattered by a war over which they had no control.

With all the moral authority of the office which I hold, I say that America could have no greater and prouder role than to help to end this war in a way which will bring nearer that day in which we can have a world order in which people can live together in peace and friendship.

I do not criticize those who disagree with me on the conduct of our peace negotiations. And I do not ask unlimited patience from a people who hopes for peace have too often been raised and then cruelly dashed over the past four years.

I have tried to present the facts about Vietnam with complete honesty, and I shall continue to do so in my reports to the American people.

Tonight, all I ask is that you consider these facts, and, whatever our differences, that you support a program which can lead to a peace we can live with and a peace we can be proud of. Nothing could have a greater effect in convincing the enemy that he should negotiate in good faith than to see the American people united behind a generous and reasonable peace offer.

In my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to end this war in a way that would increase our chances to win true and lasting peace in Vietnam, in the Pacific, and in the world. I am determined to keep that pledge. If I fail to do so, I expect the American people to hold me accountable for that failure.

But while I will never raise false expectations, my deepest hope, as I speak to you tonight, is that we shall be able to look back on this day, at this critical turning point when American initiative moved us off dead center and forward to the time when this war would be brought to an end and when we shall be able to devote the unlimited energies and dedication of the American people to the exciting challenges of peace.

Thank you, and good night.

Sec. Laird Explains Responsibility of Department of Defense

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird took the occasion of Armed Forces Day to laud this country's members in uniform for their courage, competence and sacrifice around the world, while at the same time he noted that "the defense community is being subjected to a barrage of attacks here at home."

He explained to the Chicago Chapter of the Military Order of the World Wars, "As long as the Defense Department is assigned the job of providing security for our nation in this real, uncertain and high-risk world, it is going to cost a lot of money."

Following are highlights of Secretary Laird's Armed Forces Day speech where he described responsibilities of the military and civilians:

Armed Forces Day, 1969, finds more than 500,000 Americans in Vietnam engaged in the most difficult kind of war. In that war, our young people are proving that they constitute the best fighting force we have ever had. They are setting an example of courage, competence and sacrifice that should inspire us all. Uniquely, they also constitute a building force. For while they are engaged in combat, at the same time they are engaged in broad activities to help the South Vietnamese build a stronger and better nation for themselves.

In Korea, our soldiers, sailors and airmen keep a lonely and dangerous vigil against the very real threat of armed aggression from an increasingly belligerent North Korea.

In Europe, in the Arctic, on and under each of the seven seas, American servicemen are responding to their nation's call. They bear the risks, hardships, loneliness, and the separation from loved ones in order that we at home may enjoy our freedom in security.

Ironically, even as we gather to honor our men in uniform, the defense community is being subjected to a barrage of attacks here at home.

My remarks here tonight may reflect undue concern about the current onslaught on the military. Yet, as I observe some of the irresponsible attacks of today, I recall a similar nation aberration of the 1930's and the dangerous consequences it had. Then it was fashionable to lay the blame for war on those called the merchants of death—the munitions makers. An influential part of the press, the Congress and the public was persuaded that the way to avoid war was to maintain token military forces and to stop "fattening munitions makers" by spending for armaments. And so, while Hitler created the military force that was to sweep across most of Europe, the United States allowed its armed forces to become weak. Our weakness put us in no position to prevent World War II and in poor position to fight it for a year or more after we got in it.

I anticipate no such consequences now because I believe firmly that the American people still want and will continue to demand that America remain sufficiently strong to deter war.

But much of the harsh criticism now being levelled at the military disturbs me greatly and it frightens me too; not because I am Secretary of Defense—I have only been in that office for three months. It disturbs me because for the most part, it is totally misplaced criticism. It frightens me because it is symptomatic of a frame of mind which can have grave consequences for the security of our country.

Our men in uniform carry out national policy; they do not formulate it. Civilians decide our national security policy; civilians decide the strategies we shall follow; civilians decide our force structures; and civilians run the Department of Defense. Decisions on national policy are made, not by military men, but by civilians in the executive and legislative branches of government and ultimately by the civilian commander-in-chief, the President of the United States. The men and women of our armed services execute those policies—with courage and determination, and loyalty; they do not choose the commitments we have around the world. But they do undertake the hardships and risks necessary to honor those commitments.

It seems particularly ironic to me that the military is blamed today for policy decisions made earlier during periods when civilian control over the military was tighter and more extensive than ever before.

The complaint is often heard that too much of the nation's resources go for defense. There are even those who say the cause of our domestic difficulties—urban problems, racial tensions, student unrest—stems from the unnecessary diversion of national revenues to defense needs. Now it is a fact that defense costs are high. In my opinion, they are too high. That is why in our initial review of the Fiscal Year 1970 budget prepared by the previous Administration, we reduced appropriations requests by more than $3 billion.

But that is not the real issue. The real issue boils down to whether the American people—the real source of decision in this democratic system of ours—want to keep paying the high price real security in this uncertain world demands.

Policies that go back to the Truman Administration have resulted in commitments to our Allies in many parts of the world. With commitments of such magnitude, defense will of necessity be costly.

Yet, a common complaint is that defense spending is wasteful. No one—not even our severest critics—is more interested than the new team at the Pentagon in avoiding mistakes, eliminating waste and in making every tax dollar buy full value as far as defense capability is concerned.

We all need to be clear about the meaning of the word, "waste." It is not necessarily wasteful to invest in research and development which does not pan out. Trying to anticipate our needs often as much as a full decade in advance, research will turn up some answers that say "no" as well as those which say "yes." Subject to some educated guessing, research for new weapons—or anything else for that matter—still involves the trial and error approach. But even the "no's," or failures

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Sec. Laird Explains Responsibility of Department of Defense

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do produce the single most essential ingredient, which is knowledge.

So long as we do our job in the Defense Department, there will be weapons developed, produced, deployed—and never used. This does not necessarily represent waste or failure. Far from it. It often represents success because our principal assignment is to deter war. The weapons we have now, such as the POLARIS and the MINUTEMAN Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, work. They will do exactly what they are designed to do. But I hope, as all of you do, that we will never have to use them, even though they become obsolete in the meantime.

So let there be no misunderstanding—we can reduce costs—we can prevent waste, through improved procedures and policies. But these will not result in major reductions in the costs of defense. Basically, the size of the Defense Budget is determined by the jobs the Defense Department is given to do. We at Defense do not pick our jobs, they are assigned to us.

As long as the Defense department is assigned the job of providing security for our nation in this real, uncertain and high-risk world, it is going to cost a lot of money. Even if we eliminate cost overruns, improve our cost estimates, cut out the unnecessary items and keep our systems simple, we are not going to come up with a low defense budget. No, even if we are successful in eliminating the war in Vietnam, our highest priority—we are still not going to come up with a drastically reduced defense budget—at least this Secretary of Defense will not recommend drastic reductions in defense spending, under presently foreseeable circumstances.

Do not misunderstand me. The American people are the ultimate bosses in this country. If they want even a $50 billion defense budget, they can certainly get it. But a drastically reduced defense budget will not provide adequate national security in the world in which we live.

Let me now apply the general remarks I have been making to the important SAFEGUARD ABM program. The components of this system have been developed over a period of more than a decade. It has been an orderly development. These components have been tested and are still being tested. The Safeguard system recommendation was based on the knowledge that it will work for the purpose intended. The President has the ultimate responsibility for providing for the security of this nation and its people. After carefully examining what the Soviets and Chinese are doing now, he determined that the Safeguard system is essential if we are going to be able to provide security to the United States in the years to come.

We at the Pentagon did not create the conditions which make Safeguard necessary. It is the Soviets who continue without let-up to build a force of ICBMs exceeding the size of our own, including the SS-9 which can lift one warhead of up to 25MT or three warheads of 5MT each. It is the Soviets who are building ballistic missile submarines at the rate of 6-8 per year and who are developing a Fractional Orbit Bombardment System. It is the Soviets who have already constructed an ABM system and are testing new sophisticated defense missiles. And it is the Chinese Communists who are working to acquire a nuclear delivery force.

The job of the Department of Defense is to maintain peace. No one understands this mission better than our military leaders. No one prizes peace as highly as do these men who know first-hand how brutal war can be.

The relationship between our arms and peace is clear. Without them the world would have known much less peace and much less freedom than it has in the past twenty years. President Kennedy in 1963 said, ". . . more than anything, the fact that this country is secure and at peace, the fact that dozens of countries allied with us are free and at peace, has been due to the military strength of the United States."

If we in the Defense Department are to fulfill our job of providing security to our nation, we cannot ignore these things. To provide security in this real world requires knowledgeable and decisive leadership from the Administration. Under President Nixon's able guidance I believe we are getting that leadership. To provide security in this real world requires from those in uniform a strong sense of duty, dedication and unparalleled loyalty. Our military men are providing that. But to provide security in this real world also costs money—and lots of it. We are determined to be good stewards with the funds entrusted to us; but so long as we are assigned the mission to provide security for our nation, we are going to request the money necessary to do the job. And money to start on the Safeguard system is necessary to assure our future security.

It is not the responsibility of the Department of Defense to answer a question only the American people can answer. If the people want continued security for the nation as I believe strongly they do, they can continue to demand it. Our defense community is prepared to provide it. If, on the other hand, our nation wants a drastically reduced defense budget, it can demand that too. And such a structure will be provided with the same loyalty and dedication as before.

But there should be no mistake—national security in today's world and a drastically reduced defense budget simply do not go together. Under present circumstances they are mutually exclusive alternatives.

The American people should not assume that the armed forces can provide security without adequate resources.

Nor should the American people expect their Defense Department to force security upon them, or upon the Congress. The Department can recommend what appears to us to be necessary to provide security, but the decision of whether to undertake the job belongs to the American people.

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